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This article examines the quality assurance (QA) regime of higher educa-
tion (HE) in Mexico. In particular, we examine how the regulatory frame-
work of HE quality has evolved in the past three decades and the different
regulatory configurations and policy instruments used by QA agencies.
We argue that the Mexican case is illustrative of a (weak) hybrid regula-
tory model that combines the policy instruments of both a state-centred
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As a result of economic and political liberalisation in the 1990s and 2000s, the so-called
regulatory state expanded to different policy sectors (e.g. electricity, food safety, telecom-
munications, work safety, among others) and different levels of government (national,
international, regional), and also became an important influence on the governance of
higher education (HE) (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005; García-Juanatey et al., 2020). The
regulatory state expanded to the HE sector through the creation of independent agen-
cies to enact and introduce new regulatory instruments such as external evaluations and
assessments of the quality of HE institutions (HEIs).
In the United States university initiatives promoted the creation of independent agen-
cies to assess the quality of HE institutions. For their part, in some European countries
quality assurance (QA) agencies were established by public initiatives. In the 1990s
Latin America experienced an increase in the number of higher education institutions
that relied on external organisations to obtain formal recognition through accreditation
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programmes (Buendía-Espinosa, 2013). Mexico is a representative example of how QA
bodies expanded in the Latin American region, with the emerge of several agencies –
some of them formally independent from the executive branch – that evaluate and
accredit educational quality in HE through public, private or mixed organisations
(Martínez-Iñiguez, Tobón, and Romero Sandoval, 2017).
This article aims to contribute to the understanding of how QA agencies have evolved
in Mexico, as well as the difficulties faced in gaining leverage in a complex institutional
landscape. To analyse the evolution and the current design of the Mexican QA regu-
latory governance of HE – their agencies and instruments – we use the three models
of higher education developed by Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011) and Dobbins and
Knill (2009), as well as the HE (hybrid) governance models and their instruments high-
lighted by Capano and Pritoni (2018, 2020), Van Vught (1995), and Van Vught and
De Boer (2015). In addition, we examine the activities carried out by QA agencies for
both public and private HEIs in Mexico. Mexico is an interesting case for examining
the agencification process since – in comparison to other Latin American institutional
arrangements – it does not have a single national regulatory QA agency. Rather, it has
created several agencies that deploy a panoply of instruments with different regulatory
mandates, scopes and capacities.
This article is divided into five parts. First, we present the three models of HE devel-
oped by Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011) and Dobbins and Knill (2009), as well as
their corresponding policy instruments. In the second section we present the evolution
of quality assurance regimes in Mexico since the 1970s. In the third section we present
the current configuration of the quality assurance agencies. In the fourth section we dis-
cuss the activities carried out by QA agencies at both public and private HE institutions.
Finally, we present our conclusions.
Models and Policy Instruments of the Regulatory State in Higher
Education
The introduction of the regulatory state in the HE sector can be traced back to processes
of economic and political liberalisation carried out in the 1980s and the 1990s and
‘changes in state–society relations, partly inspired by New Public Management (NPM)
templates’ (Maassen, Moen, and Stensaker, 2011: 480). Magalhães and Amaral (2009:
187) argue that HE policies received the attention of NPM reforms along with many
other sectors, specifically those related to social policies. These changes over the last three
decades have reconfigured the role of the state in HE in many countries, specifically, the
relationship between governing and governance processes, to the extent that King (2015)
refers to this configuration as a HE regulatory state. As Capano and Pritoni highlight,
in general, governance reforms have been based on the following aspects:
institutional autonomy; new competitive funding mechanism; the quality
assessment of research and teaching; internal institutional governance; and
the changing role of the state (less commander and controller and more
supervision from a distance). (Capano and Pritoni, 2020: 30)
When it comes to the case of QA policies, universities in the United States developed
QA instruments in the late nineteenth century. As Jarvis (2014) argues, from the late
1960s to the 1980s these reforms were essentially adopted and implemented in most
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Anglo-Saxon countries ruled by conservative governments. In Europe two reform ini-
tiatives, the Bologna Declaration in 1999 and the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, accelerated
the reform process in higher education (Maassen, Moen, and Stensaker, 2011). As a
result of this gradual process, ‘nearly half the countries in the world now have QA sys-
tems or QA regulatory bodies for higher education’ (Jarvis, 2014: 156). Gornitzka and
Stensaker (2014: 180) point out that the development of the ‘external QA systems in
[Western] Europe in the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s’ were ‘seen as part
of a modernisation of the governance of HE often including the aim of providing HEIs
with more autonomy, ensuring a stronger institutional leadership of universities, and
a reformed funding system emphasising a stronger result-orientation’. It is within this
context that the establishment of QA agencies became a central mechanism for per-
forming external evaluations. The number of agencies rapidly increased and resulted
in the creation of international and continental agency networks such as the European
Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA).
In a comparative study, Billing (2004) demonstrates the diversity in the different
models of national QA regulatory governance regimes for HE. The study argues that
although there are some elements that apply in many countries, national QA frame-
works differ in key features, such as the institutional design of the national agencies, as
well as whether participation is voluntary or compulsory. In a similar line, Maassen and
Stensaker (2011: 8) emphasise that the forms of evaluations carried out by these agen-
cies differ as ‘they covered a variety of methods and approaches to quality assurance,
approaches usually tailored to specific national needs’.
With the aim of understanding the context in which QA agencies operate, we use the
typology developed by Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011) and Dobbins and Knill (2009)
of three historically European models of higher education– the state-centred model, the
academic self-governance model and the market-oriented model – that correspond to
different interactions between the state, the market and academia. In the first model
the state controls the QA regime and the universities have relatively little autonomy,
specifically because this model ‘conceives universities as state-operated institutions. The
state directly coordinates all or most aspects of HE, such as admission requirements,
curricula, exams, nomination of academic personnel’ (Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle, 2011:
670). The second model, also called the Humboldt model, ‘is based on a state–university
partnership, governed by principles of corporatism and collective agreement’ (Dobbins,
Knill, and Vögtle, 2011: 671). Although this model assumes that the academic com-
munity is in charge of university affairs, ‘the state remains a potent actor thanks to
diverse planning and financial laws limiting the scope of self-governance’ (Dobbins,
Knill, and Vögtle, 2011: 671). Finally, in the market-oriented model universities ‘com-
pete for students and financial resources’ and see themselves in the role of producers
and entrepreneurs, ‘which offer academic services to students’ (Dobbins, Knill, and Vög-
tle, 2011: 672).
From a complementary perspective, some scholars (Van Vught, 1995; Van Vught
and De Boer, 2015; Capano and Pritoni, 2020) propose governance models for examin-
ing HE regimes, namely the state control model, the state supervising model and the
market-oriented/neoliberal model. The first model relies on the idea of strong state
centralisation and control mechanisms over the actors/institutions that are subject to
regulation. This model corresponds to the ideal type of the state-centred model high-
lighted by Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011), in which the most used policy instru-
ments – understood as ‘means, tool or technique by which a government wields its power
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in attempting to ensure support or effect, or prevent, social change’ – are highly restric-
tive. This model is focused on ‘instruments of authority’ (Van Vught and De Boer, 2015:
41–43), such as licences, warrants and vouchers, and instruments of ‘the power of trea-
sure’, such as transfers and bearer-directed payments (Van Vught and De Boer, 2015:
41–43). Some examples of the former type of instruments include conditionals, which
‘are the promises by the government to act in a certain way when certain conditions arise’
(Van Vught and De Boer, 2015: 43); while an example of the second type are government
payments under specific conditions. Although one might expect that market-oriented
models use both types of instruments, in general, (positive or negative) constraints, pro-
hibitions activities and treasures are mainly used by governments.
For its part, the second model emphasises the self-regulatory capacities of HE institu-
tions, and the role of the government as arbiter and ‘game designer’, instead of the main
actor that controls diverse aspects of HE systems (Van Vught and De Boer, 2015: 39).
This second model, which is highly related to the self-governance model developed by
Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011), is characterised by the usage of ‘instruments of infor-
mation’ (responses and messages) in which the government focuses on gathering infor-
mation, and ‘the mildly restrictive instruments of authority (certificates and approvals)’
(Van Vught and De Boer, 2015: 39). Examples of these type of instruments are those
‘that attempt to build incentives into the system through administrative accountability
schemes that incorporate performance-based rewards and sanctions’ (Hannaway and
Woodroffe, 2003: 4).
Finally, the market-model (also called the neoliberal model by Capano and Pri-
toni, 2020) is based on instruments whose main objective is to ‘introduce competition
and choice in the education systems’ and to offset/correct problems with market fail-
ures (Hannaway and Woodroffe, 2003: 4), such as those based on competition and
managerialisation.
QA agencies can be structured in different ways according to the adopted HE gover-
nance model. For instance, liberal models are more likely to encourage the marketisation
of HE through QA instruments that pursue the introduction of competition among
universities. In a comparative study, Capano and Pritoni (2018: 6) mention that some
governmental reforms have created hybrid forms of governance ‘that are characterised
by working through policy mixes, that is, policy instruments belonging to different
instrument categories or pertaining to different policy’ systems. We acknowledge that
in current democratic governance models it is possible to find hybrid QA bodies char-
acterised by a combination of instruments. Nevertheless, such ideal types allow us to
identify the predominant rationale behind each model.
Moreover, as Beerkens (2015) notes, in all governance models there has been an
increasing convergence in the adoption of NPM managerial reforms and in the creation
of quality assurance agencies, although the specific rationales of such reforms can differ
across models. For example, although some models push for the creation of autonomous
bodies to evaluate higher education quality, they can also push for higher levels of ex-post
control and performance evaluation, as well as for more hierarchical evaluation systems.
For their part, other types of quality assurance regimes are more likely to promote the
creation of agencies with more formal and de facto levels of independence from the
executive branch (Beerkens, 2015).
Our study focuses on examining QA regulatory regimes, by paying particular atten-
tion to agencies and instruments regulating the quality of HE at both public and private
HEIs in Mexico. When examining these agencies, it is important to clarify whether
they perform accreditation processes or quality assessments. As Fairweather and
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Blalock (2015: 6), point out, accreditation ‘is meant to ensure that an institution (and,
in some cases, an academic programme) meets the minimum fiscal and academic stan-
dards to offer degrees’, while quality assurance ‘differs from accreditation in its focus
on distinguishing levels of quality between institutions and academic programmes’.
Quality Assurance Policies in Mexico over Time
The First Steps Towards a State-Centred Model in HE
The expansion of the public HE institutions in Mexico was particularly salient from
1950 to 1979 when the state operated as the principal provider of HEIs. By controlling
the provision of public HEIs, Kent (1993: 77) suggests, the central government grad-
ually ‘designed and legitimated various national plans for the development of higher
education’. In this period, HE policies were oriented to develop coverage across different
regions/states as a response to industrialisation and urbanisation processes. In brief, at
this stage, the fundamental role of the state was to fund the expansion of HEIs – through
the use of treasury policy instruments.
Nevertheless, the expansion of public HE occurred without institutional consider-
ations of the consequences of increasing public enrolment. As Mendoza-Rojas (2011)
emphasises, in an authoritarian context, HE policies were set based on political consid-
erations in order to forge alliances and create loyalties (Mendoza-Rojas, 2011). In this
context, during this period of expansion, there were no policies in place for QA, either
for public or private universities (Kent, 1993; Tuirán and Muñoz, 2010). All in all, dur-
ing this period, the central government started to create – in an isolated manner – some
governmental agencies which were not independent from the executive branch, such as
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT, National Council for Science
and Technology) in 1970, with the goal of creating public research centres as a way of
nurturing scientific research which later on was the basis for developing mechanisms of
QA for faculty performance and postgraduate programmes at both public and private
HE institutions.
The ‘Modernisation’ of the State-Centred Model and the Growth
of Private HE Providers
At the beginning of the 1980s, the external debt crisis and the sudden decrease in oil
prices caused the Mexican economic model to collapse. As a result, both the growth
of public investment and public services decreased (Kent, 1993; Mendoza-Rojas, 2011;
Mungaray et al., 2016).
The state reduced its investment in public education, while the private sector took
advantage and gradually consolidated a bigger presence in HE. Although public funding
‘for HE and research decreased by approximately 25 percent between 1981 and 1989’
(Kent, 1993: 78), the 1980s were characterised by a public sector that focused on the
expansion of total enrolment at existing institutions, whereas in the private sector new
institutions were created achieving territorial expansion (Tuirán and Muñoz, 2010).
Hence, while public universities were historically seen as the ‘training centres for
Mexico’s elites’ (Kent, 1993: 79), the growth of private universities was also accom-
panied by a decreased level of confidence for some sectors of society – particularly
employers – in public HE (see Table 1).
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Table 1. Number of Higher Education Institutions and Students, 1960–1999
Higher education institutions 1960 1970 1980 1988 1999
Public institutions 39 73 143 394 515
Private institutions 18 43 126 332 735
Total 57 116 269 726 1250
Number of students (first
degree studies)
77,033 208,944 731,147 1,078,191 1,481,999
Percentage increase NA 271.2 349.9 147.5 137.5
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD, 2008, p. 18.
As a result of the exponential growth experienced in previous decades, the central gov-
ernment established controls on public spending in HE, and started to formulate national
plans and new ways of coordinating the allocation of public resources. For instance,
during the administration of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, the central government
established a National Higher Education Program (PRONAES) in 1984–1985, with the
aim of establishing, in addition to the regular budget of HEIs, a complementary and
conditional fund for public HEIs – subject to evaluations and renewal processes – on
the basis on their performance (Rodríguez-Gómez, 2002: 135). Although this particu-
lar initiative did not continue with subsequent governments, the idea of adjusting the
budget of public universities relative to their performance quality persisted.
According to Rodríguez-Gómez and Ordorika (2012: 224) the 1990s brought
a neoliberal economic doctrine which shaped the restructuring of the HE sys-
tem in Mexico, specifically through economic stimulus and conditional funding
(Mendoza-Rojas, 2011). For example, throughout the 1990s, during the administration
of Carlos Salinas, the government, along with the political support of the National
Association of Higher Education Institutions and Universities (ANUIES), developed
new forms of financing based on funds which were conditional on the implementation
of measures that would strengthen the quality of education (Rodríguez-Gómez, 2002).
Consequently, the budgetary process was transformed into negotiations based on a
rationale more oriented towards market competition. Against this backdrop, evaluation
was the tool for enhancing quality in the HE, but also a means for obtaining conditional
public funding (Mendoza-Rojas, 2011).
In 1989, the central government created the National Evaluation Commission
(CONAEVA) with the aim of articulating a national system of evaluation in HE, specifi-
cally based on self-evaluation of institutions and the external evaluation of programmes
(Buendía-Espinosa, 2013). Hence, by 1990, some public institutions had started to
carry out self-evaluation processes following CONAEVA directives. However, there was
low participation within the academic community and an absence of a clear strategy
for data aggregation and monitoring. By 1993, CONAEVA had lost its leading role in
developing the expected evaluation system and it ceased operations in 1996.
Towards a Weak Consolidation of the State-Centred Model and the
Growth of Market Providers
The 1990s brought a new episode in which internationalisation gained leverage in the
public agenda. In this context Mexico was willing to cooperate to establish a trilat-
eral accreditation mechanism for North America as part of the NAFTA negotiations.
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Nevertheless, this failed because Mexico lacked an accreditation system and therefore
the US associations prohibited any agreement. As a result, Mexico only became a mem-
ber of the Program for North American Mobility in Higher Education (NAHME). In
the long run, this event was very significant, to the extent that some experts have sug-
gested that it was a fundamental driver in the development of a QA accreditation regime
(Aboites-Aguilar, 2007).
After the creation of CONAEVA, the federal government promoted, through the
Coordinación para la Planeación de la Educación Superior (CONPES, Coordination for
the Planning of Higher Education), the creation of the Comités Interinstitucionales para
la Evaluación de la Educación Superior (CIEES, Inter-institutional Committees for the
Evaluation of Higher Education). The CIEES was created in 1991 as a non-governmental
body, an independent private non-profit institution with responsibilities regarding qual-
ity assessment and accreditation of programmes and academic units. The logic behind
the agency design was to have on the board not only governmental officials, but also uni-
versity associations and representatives from academic institutions. At this point in time,
there was not a clear distinction between the accreditation of programmes and external
evaluation of institutions through the CIEES (see ANUIES, 2018). In fact, according
to De Vries (2007): 16), central government proposals sought to include programme
accreditations as part of the CIEES functions, but the committees did not agree to enforce
compulsory regulatory standards, instead preferring that the CIEES supported the exter-
nal evaluation using a soft power approach through non-binding recommendations (De
Vries, 2007). Hence, licences to universities were still granted by the national Ministry of
Education.
In 1995, the ANUIES coordinated the elaboration of a proposal for developing a
national accreditation system. This proposal established two alternatives for the consol-
idation of a regulatory model. The first option – which required a longer implementation
period – was to formulate a comprehensive proposal for evaluation and accreditation
of institutions, academic programmes and certification of professionals. The second
proposal was to carry out partial and incremental actions, such as accreditation and
certification, which could be called ‘official’ and which, on a voluntary basis, allowed
HE institutions to obtain permits, licences and authorisations. The first proposal implied
a legal regulatory framework with a mandatory system similar to those of other Latin
American countries, such as Chile, Argentina and Colombia. The second option was
instead based on consensual and voluntary agreements between the government, HEIs
and academic associations. Subsequent policy decisions adopted in the following years
suggest that the central government opted for the second strategy based on gradual and
incremental voluntary policy changes.
Another key QA initiative during this period was developed by CONACYT in
1991 through the creation of a postgraduate quality register to recognise academic
programmes which complied with QA standards. Originally, PROMEP only con-
sidered state public universities and some technological institutes (De Vries and
Álvarez-Mendiola, 1998).
Following this trend, by 2000, the central government had created the Consejo para
la Acreditación de la Educación Superior (COPAES, Council for the Accreditation of
Higher Education,) as a non-governmental body in charge of regulating accreditation
processes and quality agencies (De Vries, 2007). It is worth noting that the creation
of COPAES –following the pattern of QA agencies created in the European Higher
Education system – responded to the need for a specialised agency for the accreditation
of programmes, as the already operating CIEES refused to expand its mandate to do
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so, as well as to the need to maintain its regulatory tasks of external evaluation and
institutional accreditation on a voluntary basis. According to Rodríguez-Gómez (2014:
201), at the time of its creation, the director of the CIEES was also director of COPAES to
ensure, at least in the first stage, control and continuity of the work developed by both
institutions. During its first decade, COPAES worked as part of the CIEES structure
until 2010, when the ANUIES General Assembly agreed to divide both agencies. The
overlap between the CIEES and COPAES was in part due to a lack of a statutory creation
and an unclear delegation of responsibilities to QA agencies. Hence, COPAES emerged
without a clear regulatory role in terms of compliance and enforcement capacities (De
Vries, 2007). However, all in all, the only agency recognised by the central government
as an accrediting agency is COPAES.
The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a new step in the restructuring process
of public HE. Vicente Fox’s administration in 2000 maintained the policies introduced
during the 1990s (Rodríguez-Gómez and Ordorika, 2012). For example, until 2003, the
CIEES’ main activities focused on institutional evaluation, and from 2004, this range of
activities covered not only public universities but also technical universities and technical
institutes.
During Peña Nieto’s presidential term, HE was not within the scope of education
reform (Mendoza-Rojas, 2017) as reform deliberately focused on compulsory education
and particularly on the evaluation of teachers. In recent decades, the main initiatives
for improving the quality of HE have been strongly associated with the relationship
between accreditation and the endowment of financial resources, in order to achieve
proposed objectives such as regulation of the growth of enrolment, programmes and
academic staff. As noted, since the 1990s this strategy was run through programmes
such as PROMEP, but also the Comprehensive Programa Institucional de Formación
de Investigadores (PIFI, Institutional Researcher Training Programme) created by SEP
in 2000, and integrated into the Programa de Fortalecimiento de la Calidad Educativa
(PFCE, Programme for Educational Quality Strengthening); and the National Programa
Nacional de Posgrados de Calidad (PNPC, National Quality Postgraduate Programme)
created by CONACYT in 1991, among others. In summary, however, Mexico does not
have proper legislation for QA in the HE system.
Current Configuration of Quality Assurance Agencies in Mexico
The current QA system of HE has evolved into an amalgam of several organisations that
operate simultaneously, and although they are intended to perform on a complemen-
tary basis, they ultimately carry out overlapping roles. The main agencies are CIEES,
COPAES, Centro Nacional para la Evaluación de la Educación Superior (CENEVAL,
National Centre for the Evaluation of Higher Education), Federación de Instituciones
Mexicanas Particulares de Educación Superior (FIMPES, Federation of Private Higher
Education Mexican Institutions) and CONACYT. The most prominent of these at under-
graduate level are CIEES, COPAES and FIMPES; and at postgraduate level, the CONA-
CYT. Below we will describe each agency to highlight their scope, as well as the role
they play in the configuration of QA agencies.
In general, this section shows that in the case of Mexico, accreditation, both of
programmes and of institutions, has been implemented as a voluntary process through
which HEIs submit themselves to the evaluation of an external body, with the intention
of obtaining public recognition for the quality of their educational work (Egido-Gálvez
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and Haug, 2006). In general, the process begins with institutional self-evaluation,
followed by the assessment performed by the external body, and is finalised with a
report written by the agency in question on the accreditation of educational quality
(Casas-Medina and Olivas-Valdez, 2011).
CIEES is focused on quality assessment, in which HE institutions can participate on a
voluntary basis. CIEES is organised around nine academic committees, seven dedicated
to the evaluation of academic programmes, and two to the evaluation of institutional
practices. Additionally, CIEES provides advice to institutions and supports the formu-
lation of principles, standards and indicators (Rodríguez-Gómez, 2014). As an example
of its performance, from ‘1991 to July 2006, the CIEES assessed 2,910 programmes’,
representing ‘roughly 20 percent of the programmes offered in the country’ (OECD,
2008: 39).
COPAES is mainly responsible for the accreditation of undergraduate academic pro-
grammes offered by both public and private HE institutions. One of the main functions
of COPAES is to supervise the performance of quality assurance bodies, established
as non-profit organisations. Institutions can submit, on a voluntary basis, their under-
graduate programmes for accreditation. COPAES’s structure of government consists
of a director general and a general assembly which contains representatives from the
Ministry of Education (SEP), ANUIES, FIMPES, and several professional associations
(representing the areas of medicine, veterinary medicine, accounting, engineering and
law), while the national academies of science, medicine and engineering participated as
founding members. COPAES has authorisation from the SEP to award accreditation for
five years with the possibility of renewal. In 2018, COPAES recognised 30 QA agencies
covering a wide variety of fields. As an example of its performance, from ‘2002 to July
2006, COPAES accredited 881 academic programmes, which constitutes nearly 7 per-
cent of all programmes in the country (30 percent of which are from the private sector)’
(OECD, 2008: 40). It is worth noting that an important advance in the process of accred-
itation was carried out as a result of the Comprehensive Institutional Strengthening
Program (PIFI), which sought to support HEI in achieving quality for their educational
programmes and services. During the implementation of the PIFI the number of aca-
demic programmes accredited by the COPAES increased from 156 programmes in 2002
to 1,707 in 2008. However, PIFI was not properly implemented throughout the diversity
of HE subsystems.
CONACYT is the leading public institution for the evaluation and quality certifi-
cation of postgraduate programmes, both for private and for public HEIs that access
public funding. In addition, CONACYT manages scholarships and keeps a database on
research and postgraduate programmes in Mexico. One major difference compared with
other accreditation agencies is that CONACYT is a governmental agency. CONACYT
guides scientific and technological policies, including professional formation, and at the
postgraduate level, manages the Programa Nacional de Posgrados de Calidad (National
Programme of Quality Postgraduates) which is a key mechanism for QA in this domain
(Buendía-Espinosa, 2013: 984). It also coordinates the assurance of research quality
through the national System of Researchers (SNI).
FIMPES – whose accreditation processes began operating in 1994 – formally oper-
ates as a non-profit organisation and is composed of the main private universities in Mex-
ico. FIMPES accredits – on a voluntary basis – educational institutions that comply with
quality standards, and such accreditations are based on FIMPES’s established bench-
marks. It has a Technical Advisory Board which is a collegiate body mainly composed
of senior figures of private HE institutions. As Acosta-Rocha (2015) argues, FIMPES
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operates as an assessment body, but at the same time, is composed of the institutions
it evaluates, a characteristic that may lead to criticisms of biased evaluations. Against
this backdrop, Acosta-Rocha (2015) argues that private universities seek to obtain a
favourable result from FIMPES at all costs in order to maintain a positive external image.
CENEVAL is a non-profit civil association whose main activity is the design and
application of tools for assessing the knowledge, skills and competencies of students.
CENEVAL was created as a joint initiative between the central government, and univer-
sity associations, mainly the ANUIES and FIMPES. It is governed by a general assembly,
consisting of educational institutions, associations and colleges of professionals, social
and productive organisations, as well as representatives of the executive branch.
CENEVAL’s main contribution as a QA agency has been the design of measuring
instruments and standardised exams. These exams have worked as external evaluation
instruments, which allow students and their institutions or universities to verify their per-
formance in light of national standards. For example, the examination of the graduates
with EGELs (exam at undergraduate level) functions as a complementary certification
which students can obtain alongside their university certificate (Gago-Huguet, 2000).
This brief review of the role of several evaluation agencies shows that the Mexican
case of QA regulation is a hybrid arrangement that combines the policy instruments
of both a state-centred model and a market-oriented model. In general, the creation
of some QA agencies in Mexico has followed international trends. However, although
the central government has delegated supervisory tasks to several agencies, some still
operate with close links to the executive branch. Moreover, there has been an important
growth of private HE providers, but this change has not affected the operation of the
state-centred model or created tension between governance models. On the contrary, one
can observe a hybrid system in which market-oriented and state-centred policies coexist
through different regulatory arrangements.
Assessing the Activities Carried out by Quality Assurance Agencies
In line with comparative studies by Capano and Pritoni (2018), our study shows
that in the case of Mexico, the central government has created a diverse amalgam of
national agencies for the assessment and accreditation of HE institutions, covering
aspects including teaching, research and undergraduate and graduate programmes. In
this section, we pay particular attention to the activities carried out by the agencies in
charge of accreditation.
Mexico has increased enrolment in HEIs from 10,000 students in 1930 to over 3.7
million students in 2014 (Cremonini et al., 2015). According to ANUIES (2018): 32), in
the 2017–2018 academic year undergraduate enrolment reached 4.4 million students;
2.9 million students are enrolled in public universities and almost 1.5 million are enrolled
in private universities, distributed through 33,000 programmes in total (ANUIES, 2018:
32). These numbers correspond to a total of 3,186 HEIs, of which 968 are public and
2,218 private.
When it comes to the activities of QA agencies in accreditation processes, according
to the public register created by COPAES, as of June 2020 there are 4,034 programmes
that have been accredited, of which 3,070 belong to public universities and 964 to private
institutions (see Table 2).
As we mentioned in the previous section, QA agencies in Mexico are based on
soft instruments instead of hard rules. Because the QA regulatory regime is voluntary,
the government introduced a ‘carrot strategy’, by which it sought to incentivise the
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Public state universities 1,445 35.8
Technological universities 503 12.5
Technological institutes 355 8.8
Decentralised technologicals 327 8.1
Public federal universities 249 6.2
Other HEIs 118 2.9
Polytechnic universities 69 1.7
Intercultural universities /pedagogical schools 4 0.1
Total public institutions 3,070 76.1
Private subsystem
Private universities 964 23.9
Total HEIs 4,034 100
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD, 2008.
incorporation of evaluation and accreditation practices. However, the distribution of
those accreditations demonstrates that this economic strategy has had a much greater
impact on public rather than private HE institutions. Since accreditation is neither
mandatory nor necessary, institutions and programmes can legally operate without
any accreditation. In addition, the creation of FIMPES – a non-profit organisation
composed of private universities and their authorities – as an institution focused on the
institutional accreditation of private universities does not imply that they can access
public funding. Hence, the lack of access to public funding for private HEIs explains
why they have not been incentivised to submit themselves for accreditation.
When it comes to the analysis of the bodies that provide accreditation, we also
observe that some provide far more accreditations than others. For example, Table 3
shows that practically 50 percent of all accredited programmes in the country were
issued by only two accrediting bodies, the Consejo de Acreditación de la Enseñanza de
la Ingeniería (CACEI, Council for the Accreditation of Engineering Education) and the
Consejo de Acreditación en Ciencias Administrativas, Contables y Afines (CACECA,
Council of Accreditation in Administrative, Accounting and Related Sciences). For
instance, CACEI has provided 1,220 programme accreditations, 1,023 for public HEIs
and 197 for private institutions. Meanwhile CACECA has accredited 855 programmes,
587 of them from public institutions and 268 from private ones. In this regard, while
CACEI has accredited a higher number of public programmes, CACECA has a higher
number of private accredited programmes. Clearly engineering programmes are con-
centrated in public institutions, while the distribution of business and administrative
programmes demonstrates a more competitive dynamic between private and public
institutions.
In addition, Table 4 also shows that there is broad variation in the number of accred-
ited programmes across regions. In particular, it shows how diverse the HE system is with
regard to differences in accreditation levels between public and private institutions across
states, as well as how that diversity may relate to other variables such as the average level
of schooling of the economically active population, and the level of marginalisation. We
observe that states with the largest number of accredited programmes are the states of
Mexico and Mexico City. Together, both regions contain a high percentage of Mexico’s
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ACCECISO 148 120 28
ANÀDEH 107 64 43
ANPROMAR 20 20 0
CACEB 56 55 1
CACECA 855 587 268
CACEI 1,220 1,023 197
CAESA 81 73 8
CAPEF 13 0 13
CAPEM 16 16 0
CEPPE 59 30 19
CENEIP 115 61 54
COAPEHUM 137 122 15
COMACAF 14 14 0
COMACE 53 49 4
COMACEO 3 3 0
COMAEF 32 29 3
COMAEM 101 53 48
COMAPROD 92 39 53
COMEAA 150 146 4
CONAC 68 25 43
CONACE 57 49 8
CONACI 16 8 8
CONAECQ 40 37 3
CONCAPREN 52 29 23
CONEVET 20 19 1
CONFEDE 53 53 0
Total 3,578 2,724 884
Source: Own elaboration based on COPAES https://www.copaes.org/consulta.php (Accessed June
2020).
population, and – compared to other states – are highly developed and have medium
and very low levels of marginalisation, respectively. Another aspect worth highlighting is
that the level of education of the economically active population is also among the high-
est in the country. This suggests that better-quality universities are located in markets
with better levels of development and where the population has better opportunities to
access education.
When it comes to differences in the levels of accreditation obtained by public and
private universities, Table 4 shows that the public universities in each state have a
higher percentage of accredited programmes. With regard to private universities, we
also note that a small number of private universities accounts for a high number of
accredited programmes – such as the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores
de Monterrey (ITESM, Technological Institute of Higher Studies of Monterrey). In
contrast, Mexico City demonstrates a different picture of private institutions with
accredited programmes, with the highest number of private accredited institutions, 201
out of a total of 385. It is the only state where accredited private HEIs exceed public
ones.
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Aguascalientes 37 6 6 3
Baja California 131 8 44 6
Baja California Sur 23 5 0 0
Campeche 73 8 0 0
Chiapas 80 8 11 4
Chihuahua 120 10 7 4
Ciudad de México 173 10 225 17
Coahuila 92 12 19 1
Colima 57 3 0 0
Durango 39 12 25 3
Estado de Mexico 390 34 29 3
Guanajuato 129 16 35 5
Guerrero 37 7 1 1
Hidalgo 113 15 3 1
Jalisco 181 11 69 8
Michoacan 108 21 17 5
Morelos 41 5 0 0
Nayarit 42 6 0 0
Nuevo Leon 76 4 38 4
Oaxaca 33 10 1 1
Puebla 222 25 114 10
Queretaro 56 6 50 4
Quintana Roo 51 8 16 2
San Luis Potosi 76 6 10 2
Sinaloa 102 7 0 0
Sonora 155 13 11 2
Tabasco 155 13 11 2
Tamaulipas 91 13 65 10
Tlaxcala 53 7 0 0
Veracruz 213 23 11 3
Yucatan 95 13 46 5
Zacatecas 52 12 0 0
Source: Own elaboration based on COPAES https://www.copaes.org/consulta.php [accessed June 2020].
Although the distribution of accredited programmes among public and private HEIs
in general is highly dispersed, some universities – public and private – dominate, with
a high number of accredited programmes. For instance, four public universities across
four states have the highest number of accredited programmes. These are the Univer-
sity of Guadalajara with 133 programmes, the University of Veracruz with 130, the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) with 113, and the Autonomous
University of the State of Mexico with 112. Interestingly, UNAM, the biggest univer-
sity in the country, only has 71 accredited programmes on its campus in Mexico City,
and 42 accredited programmes in different campuses located across the state of Mex-
ico. This data also shows that quality assurance has been far more important for public
HEIs. All in all, although the number of accreditations has increased in the last decade,
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the operation of the QA regime as a whole for HE in Mexico has been limited, both for
private and for public institutions (OECD, 2008).
Conclusions
Our results have shown that the QA regime of HE in Mexico evolved into an amalgam
of several organisations that operate simultaneously, and although they are intended
to perform on a complementary basis, they ultimately carry out overlapping roles. The
study has shown that the last three governments have opted for a hybrid set of soft mech-
anisms to incentivise the adoption and implementation of quality instruments. Although
some QA agencies, such as COPAES and CIEES, have made some progress in the trans-
formation of HE policies, the indicators used by these institutions to rate educational
quality – such as increasing the level of schooling of academic staff and consolidat-
ing infrastructure – do not actually measure the quality of education but instead the
necessary conditions to carry out educational processes (Fernández-Fassnacht, 2017).
Although the state has remained the biggest supplier of HE, we have shown that there
has been an important growth of private providers in recent decades. In particular, our
study has shown that the QA regime in Mexico performs differently in public and private
HEIs. While public HEIs make greater use of QA mechanisms, their implementation
in private institutions is not as prominent in a HE regime characterised by growing
private participation. Consequently, the accreditation system has not become a quality
signal from a market perspective. These heterogeneous activities can be explained by
the voluntary design of the regulatory instruments, in which the central government has
implemented funds for the modernisation of HEIs, including the incorporation of QA
practices. These public funds have not included private institutions. Only recently, in
2017, did the government activate a mechanism to incorporate some QA requirements
into the licensing process for private institutions, but their performance seems to remain
on the same trajectory as previous years.
Research on the HE regime in Mexico has highlighted the need for a new insti-
tutional framework that can lay the foundations for a more integrated QA regime
(Moreno, 2014). A new evaluation policy must overcome the current logic of resource
allocation, and move from a vision that privileges the evaluation of inputs (enrolment,
teaching staff, educational programmes) to one that values results and impacts, espe-
cially in terms of learning, construction of knowledge, employability and contribution
to social equality across regions. In addition, other crucial points to develop include the
coordination between HEIs and external stakeholders (Fernández-Fassnacht, 2017),
and the strengthening of accountability for the quality assurance regime vis-à-vis society
and other institutional players, such as the legislative branch. Since regulatory practices
of QA agencies can serve as instruments for the social regulation of welfare state social
services, further analysis is needed for assessing to what extent the performance of
QA agencies affects quality in the geographical distribution of accreditations, and
subsequently, the equity of HE services and access.
References
Aboites-Aguilar, H. (2007) ‘Tratado de libre comercio y educación superior: el caso de Méx-
ico, un antecedente para América Latina’. Perfiles educativos 29(118): 25–53.
© 2021 The Authors. Bulletin of Latin American Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies
14 Bulletin of Latin American Research
Regulation and quality assurance
Acosta-Rocha, A. (2015) ‘La FIMPES y la mejora de la calidad de instituciones privadas: un
estudio acerca del concepto de calidad y de los procesos de acreditación en tres univer-
sidades particulares’. Revista de la educación superior 44(3): 169–175.
Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior (2018) Visión y
acción 2030. Propuesta de la ANUIES para renovar la educación superior en México.
Diseño y concertación de políticas para impulsar el cambio institucional. [WWW
document]. URL http://www.anuies.mx/media/docs/avisos/pdf/VISION_Y_ACCION_
2030.pdf [accessed 3 August 2020].
Beerkens, M. (2015) ‘Quality Assurance in the Political Context: In the Midst of Different
Expectations and Conflicting Goals’. Quality in Higher Education 21(3): 231–250.
Billing, D. (2004) ‘International Comparisons and Trends in External Quality Assurance of
Higher Education: Commonality or Diversity?’. Higher Education 47(1): 113–137.
Buendía-Espinosa, A. (2013) ‘Genealogía de la evaluación y acreditación de instituciones en
México’. Perfiles educativos 35(1): 17–32.
Capano, G. and Pritoni, A. (2018) ‘Varieties of Hybrid Systemic Governance in European
Higher Education’. Higher Education Quarterly 73: 10–28.
Capano, G. and Pritoni, A. (2020) ‘What Really Happens in Higher Education Governance?
Trajectories of Adopted Policy Instruments in Higher Education over Time in 16 Euro-
pean Countries’. Higher Education 80: 989–1010.
Casas-Medina, E. V. and Olivas-Valdez, E. (2011) ‘El proceso de acreditación en programas
de educación superior: un estudio de caso’. Omnia 17(2): 53–70.
Cremonini, L. et al. (2015) ‘Cultures of Quality: An International Perspective: Profiles of
Quality Assurance’ in B. Burn (ed.) Higher Education in Nine Countries. QAA: Glouces-
ter, 1–82.
De Vries, W. and Álvarez-Mendiola, G. (1998) ‘El Promep: ¿posible, razonable y deseable?’.
Sociológica 13(36): 165–185.
De Vries, W. (2007) ‘La acreditación mexicana desde una perspectiva comparativa’. Revista
Complutense de Educación 18(2): 11–28.
Dobbins, M. and Knill, C. (2009) ‘Higher Education Policies in Central and Eastern Europe:
Convergence toward a Common Model?’. Governance 22(3): 397–430.
Dobbins, M., Knill, C. and Vögtle, E. M. (2011) ‘An Analytical Framework for the
Cross-Country Comparison of Higher Education Governance’. Higher Education 62:
665–683.
Egido-Gálvez, I. and Haug, G. (2006) ‘La acreditación como mecanismo de garantía de la
calidad: tendencias en el espacio europeo de educación superior’. Revista Española de
Educación Comparada 12: 81–112.
Fairweather, J. and Blalock, A. E. (2015) ‘Higher Education: The Nature of The Beast’ in
J. Huisman, D. Dill and M. Souto-Otero (eds.) The Palgrave International Handbook
Of Higher Education Policy and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan: London, 3–19.
Fernández-Fassnacht, E. (2017) ‘Una mirada a los desafíos de la educación superior en Méx-
ico’. Innovación educativa. 17(74): 183–207.
Gago-Huguet, A. (2000) ‘El CENEVAL y la evaluación externa de la educación en México’.
Revista electrónica de investigación educativa 2(2): 106–114.
García-Juanatey, A. et al. (2020) ‘Independence, Accountability and Responsibilities
of Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education: European and Latin American
Countries Compared’. European Journal of Higher Education. [WWW document]. URL
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/215682
35.2020.1850309?journalCode=rehe20 [accessed 15 February 2021].
Gornitzka, Å. and Stensaker, B. (2014) ‘The Dynamics of European Regulatory Regimes
in Higher Education: Challenged Prerogatives and Evolutionary Change’. Policy and
Society 33(3): 177–188.
Hannaway, J. and Woodroffe, N. (2003) ‘Policy Instruments in Education’. Review of
Research in Education 27: 1–24.
© 2021 The Authors. Bulletin of Latin American Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies
Bulletin of Latin American Research 15
Jimena Hernández-Fernández et al.
Jarvis, D. S. L. (2014) ‘Regulating Higher Education: Quality Assurance and Neo-Liberal
Managerialism in Higher Education: A Critical Introduction’. Policy and Society 33(3):
155–166.
Kent, R. (1993) ‘Higher Education in Mexico: From Unregulated Expansion to Evaluation’.
Higher Education 25: 73–83.
King, R. (2015) ‘Institutional Autonomy and Accountability’ in J. Huisman et al. (eds.) The
Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance. Palgrave
Macmillan: London, 485–505.
Levi-Faur, D. and Jordana, J. (2005) ‘Globalizing Regulatory Capitalism’. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 598(1): 6–9.
Maassen, P., Moen, E. and Stensaker, B. (2011) ‘Reforming Higher Education in The Nether-
lands and Norway: The Role of the State and National Modes of Governance’. Policy
Studies 32(5): 479–495.
Maassen, P. and Stensaker, B. (2011) ‘The Knowledge Triangle, European Higher Education
Policy Logics and Policy Implications’. Higher Education 61: 757–769.
Magalhães, A. and Amaral, A. (2009) ‘Mapping Out Discourses on Higher Education Gov-
ernance’ in J. Huisman (ed.) International Perspectives on the Governance of Higher
Education: Alternative Frameworks for Coordination. Routledge: London, 182–197.
Martínez-Iñiguez, J. E., Tobón, S. and Romero Sandoval, A. (2017) ‘Problemáticas rela-
cionadas con la acreditación de la calidad de la educación superior en América Latina’.
Innovación educativa 17(73): 79–96.
Mendoza-Rojas, J. (2011) ‘Financiamiento público de la educación superior: un largo recor-
rido de avances e insuficiencias’ in C. Pallán Figueroa and R. Rodríguez Gómez (eds.)
La SEP en el desarrollo de la educación superior. SEP-FCE: Mexico City, 225–272.
Mendoza-Rojas, J. (2017) ‘Financiamiento de la educación superior en la primera mitad del
gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto: ¿fin del periodo de expansión?’. Perfiles educativos
39(156): 119–140.
Moreno, C. I. (2014) Políticas, incentivos y cambio organizacional en la educación superior
en México. Editorial Universitaria: Mexico City.
Mungaray, A. et al. (2016) ‘La calidad de las universidades públicas estatales de México
después de 13 años de subsidios extraordinarios’. Revista de la educación superior
45(177): 67–93.
OECD (2008) Reviews of Tertiary Education: Mexico. [WWW document]. URL https://www
.oecd.org/mexico/37746196.pdf [accessed 7 August 2020].
Rodríguez-Gómez, R. (2002) ‘Continuidad y cambio de las políticas de educación superior’.
Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa 7(14): 133–154.
Rodríguez-Gómez, R. (2014) ‘Acreditación, ¿ave fénix de la educación superior?’ in
I. Ordorika (ed.) La academia en jaque. Perspectivas políticas sobre la evaluación de la
educación superior en México. UNAM y Miguel Ángel Porrúa: Mexico City, 175–216.
Rodríguez-Gómez, R. and Ordorika, I. (2012) ‘The Chameleon’s Agenda: Entrepreneural-
ization of Private Higher Education in Mexico’ in S. Marginson, I. Ordorika Sacristán,
B. Pusser and K. Kempner (eds.) Universities and the Public Sphere: Knowledge Creation
and State Building in the Era of Globalization. Routledge: London, 214–241.
Tuirán, R. and Muñoz, C. (2010) ‘La política de educación superior: trayectoria reciente y
escenarios futuros’ in A. Arnaut and S. Giorguli (eds.) Los grandes problemas de México.
El Colegio de México: Mexico City, 359–390.
Van Vught, F. and De Boer, H. (2015) ‘Governance Models and Policy Instruments’ in J. Huis-
man. et al. (eds.) The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy and
Governance. Palgrave Macmillan: London, 38–56.
Van Vught, F. A. (1995) Policy Models and Policy Instruments in Higher Education: The
Effects of Governmental Policy-Making on the Innovative Behaviour of Higher Educa-
tion Institutions. Working Paper 26. IHS Political Science Series, Institute for Advanced
Studies: Vienna, 1–50.
© 2021 The Authors. Bulletin of Latin American Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies
16 Bulletin of Latin American Research
